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Abstract
Using matched facility-level data from the US EPA Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)
and the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EEO-1 database, we assess
(1) the trade-off between jobs and environmental quality and (2) the extent to which
the distribution of the benefits of employment in industrial production mirrors the
distribution of the costs of exposure to hazardous byproducts of industrial activity in
the dimension of race and ethnicity. We find no evidence that facilities that create
higher pollution risk for surrounding communities provide more jobs in aggregate. The
share of pollution risk accruing to ethnic or racial minority groups typically exceeds the
share of employment and substantially exceeds the share of good jobs held by members
of those groups.
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1 Introduction
This study uses establishment-level data on employment and population exposure to airborne
toxic releases to analyze the relationship (and possible trade-off) between facility employment
and airborne industrial toxic exposure in order to examine the “jobs versus environment”
framework for analysis of regulatory policy. We also explore the relationship at the facility
level between the racial/ethnic profile of employment and racial or ethnic disparity in toxics
exposure. We consider how the racial and ethnic profile of populations surrounding and
affected by polluting industrial facilities compares to the profile of facility workforces.
Firms have employment profiles and environmental profiles that reflect local context,
product- and input-market conditions, technological constraints, policy and enforcement, and
managerial decisions. We match EEO-1 data from the US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) with Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and Risk Screening Environmental
Indicators (RSEI) data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2015 and 2004) to
operationalize these profiles and analyze the relationship between the EEO-1 data on employ-
ment by race/ethnicity and job category at the establishment level provide an employment
profile on reporting establishments. The employment profile reports the total number of jobs
and their distribution across occupations and across racial and ethnic groups (EEO-1 Joint
Reporting Committee, 2006; Edwards et al., 2007).
EPA data on industrial point-source toxic releases and population exposure to releases at
the facility level provide the basis for an industrial air toxics exposure profile on reporting
facilities. The air-exposure profile describes the total impact in terms of airborne potential
chronic human health risk to the population in a 50-km radius surrounding the facility; our
profile also describes how the health risk from pollution from the facility is distributed across
racial and ethnic groups.
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1.1 Research questions
A central policy-relevant question is what is the trade-off, if any, between jobs and the
environment? Previous empirical analysis has focused on the economic and employment
costs of environmental regulation (Greenstone, 2002; List et al., 2003; Belova et al., 2013;
Greenstone et al., 2012). But the employment generation of polluting activity itself has
not been widely studied. Population exposure to industrial toxics is often characterized
as a social cost that comes with the benefit of both output and employment in industrial
production. Some analysts have called the relationship into question. For example, Bezdek
et al. (2008) emphasizes employment opportunities in the field of environmental protection
and the absence of an association between environmental protection laws and regulation and
employment outcomes. Pollin (2015) gives estimates of the additional employment associated
with renewable energy and energy efficiency in comparison with fossil-fuel energy, especially
during the period of transition from a fossil-fuel economy to a green economy.
The impact of regulation and the impact of polluting activity itself are related yet distinct
and independently useful issues. Local decisionmakers in particular may be interested in
the employment and pollution potential of new facilities. There is essentially no guidance
available on the question of whether a new facility that may provide jobs is worth an addition
to the local pollution burden.
In response to a Congressional request, General Accounting Office (2002) examined the
employment and other potential benefits, such as contributions to community foundations,
local schools, or infrastructure or of volunteer work, of a selection of 15 facilities that were the
object of citizen complaints concerning discrimination against protected categories in EPA or
State Agency allocation of pollution-disposal permits. The facilities covered in the General
Accounting Office study included waste treatment plants, recycling operations, landfills,
chemical plants, and packaging facilities. No facility had been required to provide a specified
number of jobs to receive its pollution permits.
3
The pollution costs were characterized by type of pollutant but the pollution impact was
not quantified. EPA’s Office of Civil Rights recommended an analysis of the effect on property
values of proximity to the plants but the analysis was beyond the scope of the inquiry. In
addition to the characterization of the pollution and the description of employment and
community benefits, General Accounting Office examined other potential costs, such as public
subsidies.
The facilities covered in the General Accounting Office study were not required to provide
information, although most of them voluntarily provided employment information. General
Accounting Office found that the number of full-time equivalent jobs at these 15 facilities
ranged between four and 103 workers, with nine of the 15 facilities employing fewer than 25
employees. Most of the facilities also provided some information on the types of jobs at the
plant. For example, the ExxonMobil facility at Alsen, Louisiana, reported that “their facility
in Louisiana had both hourly and salaried jobs. According to ExxonMobil, its hourly jobs
included mechanics, electricians, and laboratory technicians; and its average wage was about
$23 an hour, which is equivalent to $47,840 per year. 7 Salaried jobs included engineers, a
chemist, accountants, and administrative assistants, and the average salary was just under
$70,000 annually.”
GAO comments that “the information that the facilities provided was not detailed enough
to allow us to determine the numbers for each job type, the salaries for individual jobs, or the
number of jobs filled by people from the surrounding communities. The information indicates
a wide range of salaries; however, community organizations in some locations told us that, in
their view, the majority of the jobs filled by community residents were low paying.” General
Accounting Office notes that EPA’s Office of Civil Rights recommended the collection of
more detailed information on the number and types of jobs and on those jobs provided to
the communities nearest the facilities.
That a GAO inquiry was necessary to characterize the employment–pollution tradeoff at
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only 15 plants and even then with highly limited information on the quality and distribution of
employment and the intensity and distribution of pollution points to the need for wider scale
quantitative assessment. In this analysis, we directly assess the benefit of industrial activity
in terms of employment and the provision of “good jobs” in relation to the environmental and
health cost. We do this for more than 700 high-impact facilities, which we can characterize
precisely in terms of population human health risk, employment, and the distribution of risk
and employment across vulnerable populations.
To what extent does the distribution of the benefits of employment in industrial production
mirror the distribution of the costs of exposure to the toxic byproducts of industrial activity,
in particular in the dimension of race and ethnicity? The social impact of industrial activity
on vulnerable populations is particularly contested, with many claims that employment
opportunities warrant excess population exposure.
The analysis of the matched data provides a new and unique lens for assessing the level
and distribution of costs and benefits. Where past analysis has focused largely on the impact
of environmental regulation on employment and other economic activity, we directly examine
the employment impact of pollution itself. Does employment come with the cost of increased
pollution. For a local policymaker, the analysis may give guidance on how to consider the
prospect of increased pollution with the promise of more or better jobs from a new facility.
Levinson (2015) observes that US manufacturing has substantially reduced its pollution
emissions over the past twenty years, roughly the era of the Toxics Release Inventory. The
reductions have come in large part through the reduction of pollution intensity of existing
manufacturing industries rather than through shifts in composition of on-shore activity.
In 1994 President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898 (William J. Clinton, 1994) re-
quiring all Federal agencies to “develop an agency-wide environmental justice strategy. . . that
identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income popu-
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lations.” The direction to agencies specifies actions to “promote enforcement of all health and
environmental statutes in areas with minority populations and low-income populations; ensure
greater public participation; improve research and data collection relating to the health of and
environment of minority populations and low-income populations; and identify differential
patterns of consumption of natural resources among minority populations and low-income
populations. In addition, the environmental justice strategy shall include. . . consideration of
economic and social implications. . . ”
The study provides contextual data related to enforcement that might be useful for
targeting educational and other enforcement efforts. The operational context of a facility
may be assessed, for instance, not only with the distribution of race and ethnicity in the
surrounding population but, in the case of facilities with significant environmental impact,
with the distribution of race and ethnicity in population exposure.
These data may help address the question of how decisions by public and private decision-
makers affect the relationship between exposure and employment. It should be further
possible to address the role played by federal, state, and local policy and implementation;
policy simulations are possible. For example: do firms’ local hiring agreements with local
administrators or community organizations affect the relationships between employment and
environmental impact? how effective would be a requirement that all federal contractors
provide social impact statements that report both environmental and employment impacts?
We have previously (Ash and Boyce, 2011; Ash et al., 2013) developed a methodology
for assessing gaps between disproportionately risk-exposed populations and the general
surrounding population. We now add an alternative comparator for the exposed population,
the employment profile of establishments. From a universe of facilities that produce high
pollution risk for the surrounding population, we specifically identify facilities with the
largest negative gaps between the employment profile of establishments and that of affected
populations. Our report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission identified the
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15 facilities with the largest gaps for African-Americans, the 15 facilities with the largest
gaps for Hispanics, the 15 facilities with the largest gaps for Asian-Americans and the 15
facilities with the largest gaps for Native Americans. The facility identifiers are withheld in
this article because of EEOC confidentiality requirements.
To inform cost-benefit analyses related to proposed regulations that require knowledge of
important variables, our method can provide rigorously derived estimates of the numbers of
employees potentially affected by proposed laws or regulations, as well as the number of firms
affected by the law and new regulations. The project provides a methodology for assessing
the likely employment impact of regulations that affect industrial activity.
2 Data
The EEO-1 employment data are a unique, establishment-level dataset on employment
by sex, race/ethnicity, and job category collected and analyzed by Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (2016). The EEO-1 data have high quality firm identifiers which
permit aggregation of the sex-race-ethnicity-occupation profile to the firm level. The data
permit calculation of employment levels and of the distribution of employment by job category
within establishments and firms (EEO-1 Joint Reporting Committee, 2006; Edwards et al.,
2007). Previous academic work with the EEO-1 data include research on affirmative action
in the 1980s, e.g., Leonard (1984), and, more recently, Kurtulus (2016).
Authorized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, EEO-1 requires reporting by all
firms with at least 100 employees or, for firms that hold Federal contract, by all firms at
least 50 employees. The EEO-1 data are used for compliance and enforcement with Federal
contracting rules and rules pursuant to anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII. The key
variables are counts of employees by sex, seven ethnicity/race groups (Hispanic; and Non-
Hispanic for white, black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other
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Pacific Islander, and multiple races), and ten categories of occupation (Executive/Senior
Level Officials and Managers; First/Mid-Level Officials and Managers; Professionals; and
Technicians; Sales Workers; Administrative Support Workers; Craft Workers; Operatives;
Laborers and Helpers; and Service Workers) for a total of 140 job counts per report.
We use EEO-1 data for 2010, which were provided by the EEOC with confidentiality
provisions. There were approximately 680,000 records in the complete 2010 EEO-1 data,
each representing an establishment or other unit among the firms reporting to EEOC. In
addition to the occupational distribution as described above, the data identify the industrial
sector of the establishment, the relationship between the establishment and the parent firm,
Federal contractor status, and geographic identifiers.
The TRI and RSEI data are unique as an establishment-level dataset on toxics release
and population exposure that can be aggregated to the firm level, allowing estimation of
population exposure to risk and the socio-geographic distribution of population exposure
by establishments and firms releasing industrial toxics. As co-directors of the Corporate
Toxics Information Project, the principal investigators have more than a decade of experience
working with these data. The work has included significant collaboration with the US EPA
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics of US EPA in its development of the RSEI project
and data. Peer-reviewed publications include Bouwes et al. (2003), Ash and Fetter (2004),
Ash and Boyce (2011), Ash et al. (2013), and Zwickl et al. (2014).
The TRI was created at the direction of the Congress under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) in response to the disastrous leak from Dow
Chemical facility in Bhopal, India in 1984. EPCRA requires US-located industrial facilities
meeting activity thresholds to submit annual data to EPA on deliberate and accidental
releases of some 600 toxic chemicals into air, surface water, and the ground. TRI data
are available on an annual basis starting in 1987. In 2010, 14,800 of approximately 18,000
TRI-reporting facilities released a total of 858 million pounds of these toxic chemicals directly
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into the air;1 an additional 178 million pounds were transferred to offsite incinerators. The
TRI is widely used in both corporate environmental performance and EJ literature: the
corporate performance studies typically use TRI data on the total mass (pounds) of emissions,
while EJ studies typically analyze the geographical distribution of TRI-reporting facilities in
relation to the demographics of the communities in which they are located.
The TRI data are the foremost instance of regulation by “right-to-know” in the US. The
TRI data nonetheless have important limitations. Some of these stem from the nature of the
data: the releases are annual totals, estimated, self-reported, and limited to listed chemicals
from covered facilities and processes.
The TRI data capture the largest point-source air pollution emissions in the US but omit
emissions from mobile sources, such as trucks, automobiles, ships, and aircraft. The TRI also
excludes facilities that are not required to report by dint of the 25-employee threshold or
belonging to non-listed industrial sectors. Potentially significant air polluters not covered for
these reasons include gas stations, dry cleaners, and auto-body shops. The chemicals in the
TRI do not include some major pollutants that pose significant health and environmental
risks, including particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone, carbon monoxide,
and carbon dioxide. Nor is every toxic chemical listed. A complete picture of air pollution
and the attendant health risks would include these other modes, sectors, and chemicals.
One of the most significant limitations is that the TRI simply reports pounds of chemical
releases, often generating press stories that identify local “top polluters” on this basis. Such
reporting does not account for variations in the toxicity of different chemicals, some of which,
pound-for-pound, are as much as ten million times more toxic than others. Nor does it take
into account the fate and transport of these chemicals in the environment, or the number of
people impacted. Even so, Hamilton (1995) indicates that these data are taken seriously in
1Air releases have declined sharply in recent years; in 2000 17,500 facilities released 1.9 billion pounds
directly to air, and in 2005 17,000 facilities released 1.5 billion pounds.
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terms of estimating the socioeconomic impact of polluting facilities.
The RSEI project was launched by the EPA in the mid-1990s to address several of these
limitations (Bouwes et al., 2003). The EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics processes
the TRI data on the quantity of each chemical released by each facility to create the RSEI. To
assess the human health risks posed by each release, the EPA combines this with information
on: (1) toxicity, or how dangerous the chemical is in terms of chronic human health effects; (2)
fate and transport, or how the chemical spreads from the point of release to the surrounding
area; and (3) population exposure, or how many people live in the affected areas and are
exposed to inhalation of different concentrations of the chemical. Each air release begins
at a stack, leaking valve, open canister, or other source within the facility, or at the stack
of an offsite incinerator to which the facility ships waste. The AERMOD Gaussian-plume
fate-and-transport model, is used to map how the chemical spreads from the point of release
to the surrounding geography, a 50-km radius around each facility.2 EPA combines data
on temperature and local wind patterns with facility-specific information on smokestack
height and the exit velocity of released gases, together with chemical-specific information on
molecular weight and rates of deposition and decay, to estimate the ambient concentrations
of each release in each 810m × 810m grid cell within the 50-km radius. Figure 1 provides a
schematic of the plume model (a square 101 km × 101 km catchment area in earlier versions
was replaced with a 50-km radius in RSEI version 2.3.0).
Although all TRI chemicals are toxic, their hazards to humans vary widely. By multiplying
the quantity (mass in pounds or concentration in µg per cubic centimeter) of each chemical
by a toxicity weight, EPA compares the toxicological significance of releases of different
chemicals. The EPA’s toxicity-weighting system is based on peer-reviewed databases from
several sources: the EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS); the EPA’s Office
2Transfers of toxic materials for offsite incineration are modeled from the offsite incineration facility with
an estimated destruction/removal efficiency prior to plume modeling.
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of Pesticide Programs Reference Dose Tracking Reports; the US Department of Health
and Human Services Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; the California
Environmental Protection Agency Office of Environmental Health Hazard and Assessment;
and the EPA’s Health Effects Assessment Tables. At the extreme ends of the resulting
toxicity scale for the chemicals on the TRI list, one pound of benzidine is equivalent, in
terms of inhalation toxicity, to 3.4 billion pounds of chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22), a
difference of 9 orders of magnitude. For some chemicals listed in the TRI, no consensus has
been reached on the appropriate toxicity weight; these chemicals are currently excluded from
the fully-modeled RSEI score. In recent years, the excluded chemicals have represented about
one percent of the total mass of reported toxic air releases nationwide.
For carcinogens, the EPA’s toxicity-weighting system uses inhalation-based dose-response
estimates of the excess lifetime cancer risk per unit of concentration. The toxicity-weighted
concentration is proportional to an individual’s excess risk of cancer from that concentration.
For non-carcinogens, the toxicity-weighting system uses the “Reference Concentration”,
which is the highest level of exposure concentration with no adverse health impact, and
expresses toxicity-weighted exposures as multiples of this (e.g., “six times the highest safe
concentration”). EPA has set the equivalence between the non-carcinogenic and carcinogenic
scales so that the Reference Concentration for carcinogenic risk is one excess cancer cases per
million persons. The RSEI toxicity model is additive across chemicals, without cross-chemical
interactions, and the implicit dose-response function is linear, without threshold or other
nonlinear effects.
The RSEI project overlays the grid of toxicity-weighted air pollution concentrations upon
a population grid drawn from block-level data from the US Census. The calculation of
aggregate human health risk is based on population exposure to given toxicity-weighted
concentrations. In addition to the number of people in each 810m × 810m grid cell, the
RSEI’s population weights take into account the age and sex composition of the population,
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because risk varies by the volume of air inhaled per unit of body weight. This variation is
captured in a distinct inhalation exposure factor (IEF) by age and sex groupings. The RSEI
Score thus represents the aggregate human health risk borne by the population, based on the
number of people and the extent of exposure.3 We use RSEI Scores from TRI Reporting Year
2010 reported in RSEI version 2.3.1.4 Approximately 15,000 facilities reported air releases or
incineration transfers to TRI in Reporting Year 2010.
As an aggregate population measure, the RSEI Score can also be computed for sub-
populations (Ash and Boyce, 2011). For example, the “Black RSEI Score” for a facility is
the aggregate human health risk borne by the black population in the airshed of the facility,
and the Black RSEI Share is the Black RSEI Score divided by the total RSEI Score for the
facility.
Firm and establishment name, addresses, and in some cases Dun & Bradstreet identi-
fier (DUNS) allow matching between the EEO-1 data and US EPA data. The principal
investigators have developed matching methods with the EPA data that facilitate the match
to the EEO-1 data. In some cases, a TRI facility comprises several EEO-1 establishments,
representing a distinction in the definitions of facility and establishment. In these cases we
aggregate the employment data from all of the subsumed EEO-1 establishments to match it
to the single TRI facility.
We focus on high-impact polluters (high ranks in the RSEI data) as the target to match
EEO-1 data. Although this focus constitutes a sample selection, it has advantages. First,
it contains the cost of matching, much of which, in the absence of common identifiers or
3The RSEI Score expresses potential chronic human health risk from industrial point-source air-toxic
releases aggregated for the exposed population. The RSEI Score, which combines risk from carcinogenic
and non-carcinogenic sources is unitless, and EPA (2004) recommends against its use for quantitative risk
assessment. However, the derivation of the RSEI Score implies that for carcinogens a RSEI Score of 1,000,000
corresponds to a level of population risk with one (1) excess cancer case.
4We adjust the RSEI data so that they represent the most current available about the reporting year, in
case companies revise earlier TRI reporting. In the case of downward revisions of the mass released, RSEI
scores are adjusted on the basis of the linear relation between pounds released and that release’s RSEI score.
Upward revisions or new reports are noted but do the RSEI score is not adjusted.
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crosswalks, must be done with manual assessment of the results of text- and address-matching
algorithms. Second, it concentrates attention where it counts, i.e., where the pollution
is; because of disproportionality, the top of the list that we match in fact accounts for a
substantial share of all pollution.
Our target sample comprises the 1,000 facilities with the highest air-based RSEI scores,
the measure of population potential chronic human health risk coming from industrial toxics
released to air either directly or via incineration, among the 15,000 reporting air releases
to TRI. We attempted to match these 1,000 facilities to EEO-1 establishments using name,
address, industrial sector, and DUNS. The limitation to 1,000 facilities reflects the cost of
matching. However, the top 1,000 facilities both cover much of the relevant air toxic risk
in the US and include substantial variation between facilities with lower RSEI Scores and
those with higher RSEI Scores. The top 1,000 facilities account for almost 95 percent of the
national RSEI Score for 2010, i.e., the vast majority of air toxic risk comes disproportionately
from the upper tail of the distribution. (Of the 15,000 total facilities reporting air releases,
approximately 3,700 have RSEI Scores below one.) Within the upper tail, the distribution
remains wide: the lowest RSEI Score among the top 1,000 facilities is 23,877, the seventy-fifth
percentile RSEI Score among the top 1,000 facilities is 184,717, and the highest RSEI Score
is 20,136,652.
We were ultimately able to match 712 of the top 998 TRI facilities ranked by RSEI Score
to establishments in the EEO-1 data.5 Appendix Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 show summary
statistics and distributions for the unmatched and matched samples. The matched TRI
sample significantly resembles the non-matched TRI sample in terms of distribution across
regions and industrial sectors and of average RSEI Score and the variation in RSEI Scores.
5Two facilities were dropped from the initial TRI sample of the 1,000 highest risk facilities because they
substantially revised their RY 2010 TRI submissions after we completed our matching process.
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3 Methods
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we examine the level of employment in relation to
the level of population risk generated by the facility. The “jobs versus environment” hypothesis
argues that there is a common, perhaps even necessary, tradeoff between environmental
amenities, such as clean air, and employment opportunities. We examine the level of
employment in relation to the level of population risk created by toxic air releases from the
facility. We stratify the analysis by the ten US EPA Regions and by the seven industrial
sectors (3-digit NAICS Codes) with high representation in the data. We use graphical
methods, showing scattergrams of employment versus population risk with a nonparametric
curve-fitting to show the relationship. We then use linear regression methods to summarize
the relationships.
After presenting the results for the total population and stratified results by sector and
region, we then turn to the second stage, environmental-justice component of the analysis,
examining the jobs–environment relationship for blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic whites.6
We examine the relationship between employment and pollution exposure both with and
without controls for the representation of the group in the population.
Then, using the method developed in Ash and Boyce (2011) facilities may be examined
on their total population risk, i.e., their RSEI Score, on risk for sub-populations, and on the
disparity for sub-populations between risk share and a reference share. In Ash et al. (2009),
the reference share is the population share in the city or state containing the facility. In this
study, we use instead the disparity for sub-populations between risk share and employment
share at the facility. We provide a visual display of the minority share of all jobs at each
establishment in relation to the minority share of the total human health risk. In addition
to the graphical analysis, we present a list of facilities that rank high on either of these
6Sample sizes and population representations were too small to give meaningful results for Asian-Americans
and for Native Americans; these groups are included in the later share analysis.
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alternative measurements for each of African-Americans, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and
Native Americans.
With the ethnic or racial share of pollution risk on the horizontal axis and ethnic or
racial share of employment on the vertical axis, we plot a solid black 45◦ line to indicate the
hypothetical relationship that would obtain if access to employment and exposure to pollution
for sub-populations were related equally and exclusively to prevalence in the population. That
is, in a population that was 15 percent African-American, we would expect African-Americans
to bear 15 percent of risk from pollution exposure and constitute 15 percent of employment,
which we call proportionate exposure.
We define the disparity for a facility as the vertical distance between the 45◦ line and the
point representing the establishment, or the difference between the share of the pollution-risk
burden and the share of employment. For an establishment below the 45◦ line, the nonwhite
share of pollution exposure exceeds the nonwhite share of employment, and we define this as
a positive disparity. For an establishment above the 45◦ line, the nonwhite share of pollution
falls below the nonwhite share of employment, and disparity is negative.
We then focus on job categories that are likely to be good jobs in the sense of having
higher pay, career ladders, more job security, or other desirable characteristics. The EEO-1
data track ten broad job categories, and we identify four of these categories as constituting
“good jobs”: Executive/Senior Level Officials and Managers; First/Mid-Level Officials and
Managers; Professionals; and Technicians. In some cases we assign a fifth job category,
Craft Workers, to the “good jobs” grouping, and the major conclusions are not substantively
affected. The five job categories excluded from the designation of good jobs are: Sales
Workers; Administrative Support Workers; Operatives; Laborers and Helpers; and Service
Workers. Table A.1 shows the distribution of jobs and good jobs in the full EEO-1 data, in
the EEO-1 data for the industries represented in the Toxics Release Inventory, and in the
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EEO-1 data for the establishments in the merged EEO-1 and TRI data.7
4 Results
The average facility in the sample had 508 employees with a standard deviation of 1,358
employees. Mean facility employment of African-Americans was 53 (s.d.= 119), of Hispanics
was 37 (s.d.= 88), of Asian-Americans was 21 (s.d.= 170) and of Native Americans was
2.5 (s.d.= 14). Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 show the geographic, sectoral, and
occupational distribution of the facilities in the sample.
We first report some overall figures for impact and then we examine the demographic
profile of both risk and employment of the 15 facilities with the highest total population risk
exposure and the 15 facilities with the highest cost in population risk per job and per good
job. We then examine the tradeoff between total employment and total exposure and repeat
this examination by race for non-Hispanic whites, black, and Hispanics. We then report the
minority share of all jobs and good jobs in relation to the minority share of the total human
health risk.
4.1 Risk from Airborne Industrial Toxics
Figure 2 shows the distribution of 2010 RSEI Scores, the measure of aggregate population risk
from toxic air releases from TRI facilities for the matched 712 of the top 1,000 facilities out of
approximately 15,000 facilities reporting air releases in 2010. Limiting the sample to the top
1,000 facilities truncates RSEI Scores from above at a score of approximately 23,000. The
horizontal axis is on a logarithmic scale, and hence the range of risk exposures in the sample
7Throughout we use “good jobs” as a shorthand to designate the following occupations: Executive/Senior
Level Officials and Managers; First/Mid-Level Officials and Managers; Professionals; Technicians; and
sometimes Craft Workers. Not every job in these occupational categories is in fact good in the sense of
having higher pay, career ladders, more job security, or other desirable characteristics, nor are all jobs in
the remaining categories necessarily bad in the sense of not having these qualities. Nonetheless, we see the
distinction as a reasonable shorthand for these characteristics.
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is many orders of magnitude. The mean RSEI Score for the sample is 294,000. The mean log
RSEI Score is 11.5 and the standard deviation of log RSEI Score, a scale-invariant measure
of dispersion, is 1.2. The standard deviation of log RSEI Score was fairly similar (and equally
wide) within each race/ethnic group: 1.8 for African-Americans; 1.9 for Hispanics; 1.7 for
Asian-Americans; and 1.5 for Native Americans.
4.2 Is there a jobs versus environment trade-off?
A jobs–environment trade-off implies that more population risk should be associated with
more employment, that is, the benefit of additional jobs comes at the cost of additional
population risk.
The RSEI Score per job for the facilities in the sample varies across several orders of
magnitude among these large polluters as illustrated by the nonparametric density plot in
Figure 3 (note that the horizontal scale is logarithmic). Even within the top 15 facilities
ranked by RSEI Score per job, that is, facilities creating a high population risk for each job
offered, there is substantial variation in the environmental cost per job. The top facility
generates 20 times more environmental risk per job offered than the fifteenth facility.
When we limit the analysis to good job (employment in managerial, professional, technical,
and craft occupations), the range remains similarly wide. Figure 3 shows the range of
environmental impact per good job among these large polluters (again note that the horizontal
scale is logarithmic).
In Figure 4 we examine the relationship between total facility employment and total facility
risk. Table 1 reports regression results that summarize the relationship. The scattergram,
locally smoothed regression, and linear regression together provide strong evidence that
comparing among polluting facilities, there is no relationship between employment and
population risk. Columns 1 and 2, showing our preferred log-log specification, indicate that
the elasticity of employment with respect to facility risk is nearly zero with or without controls
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for state and industry.8
An alternative linear specification reported in column 5 of Table 1 yields a statistically
insignificant negative coefficient, with an increase of 1,000,000 in RSEI Score associated with
a loss of 22 jobs; this remains the case with the addition of state and industry indicator
dummies as control variables. Similarly a linear-log specification in column 6 yields a small
statistically insignificant relationship. These results imply that among polluting facilities,
there is no relationship between the degree of environmental risk and the level employment.
Our limitation of the sample to the top 1,000 risk producers truncates the data at a RSEI
score of approximately 23,000. It is possible that a trade-off does obtain between population
risk and employment at lower levels of population risk. However, the data do span more
than four orders of magnitude of population risk (and as noted above account for roughly 95
percent of the total national RSEI score). Thus, where it counts most there is no relationship
between additional population risk and additional employment.
The right panel of Figure 4 limits the analysis to employment in good jobs (craft,
managerial, professional, and technical occupations) and total facility risk. As with population
risk and all employment, there is no relationship between the population risk generated by a
facility and its employment in good jobs. A linear regression in lieu of the locally smoothed
regression yields a statistically insignificant negative coefficient, with an increase of 1,000,000
in RSEI Score associated with a loss of 16 jobs (in column 5); this remains the case with the
addition of state and industry indicator dummies as control variables.
Figure 5 produces the same analysis as in Figure 4 stratified by EPA region. In EPA
Region 6, the South Central region (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
Texas), there appears to be a upward-sloping relationship indicating a jobs–environment
8We do not have strong prior beliefs about the appropriate functional form and report regression results
for log-log, linear-log, and linear specifications. The skew of the data in both dimensions make scatterplots
with logarithmic axes more legible than alternatives. In the regressions and scatterplots we added 1 to all
employment figures (mean= 508) and 10 to the racially/ethnically specific RSEI Scores to avoid taking log of
zero.
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tradeoff. In EPA Region 5, the Great Lakes region (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Wisconsin), there appears to be a negative relationship indicating that more
pollution is associated with fewer jobs. A linear regression summary of the locally smoothed
regression, reported in Table 1, yields a nearly identical, statistically significant coefficients of
opposite sign for these two regions, with a 1 percent change in RSEI Score associated with
a change of 0.18 percent change in employment. With a mean RSEI Score of 300,000 and
mean employment of 300, the implied response at the point of means is a RSEI Score change
of roughly 6,000 per job.
Figure 6 produces the same analysis as in Figure 4 stratified by industry for the seven
industries with at least 40 facilities in the dataset. No industry shows any substantive
relationship between employment and population risk. Chemical manufacturing is the most
common industry in the sample (see Appendix Table A.2) and on visual inspection may
have a slight upward slope (jobs–environment tradeoff). A linear regression in lieu of the
locally smoothed regression yields a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient, with an
increase — again, statistically insignificant — in RSEI Score of 1,000,000 associated with an
increase of 13 jobs (s.e.= 45).
Thus, there is neither a visual nor a statistically significant indication of any relationship
between population risk and employment for the full sample. EPA Region 6 appears to have
a positive tradeoff, EPA Region 5 a negative tradeoff of identical magnitude. There is little
evidence for a jobs–environment tradeoff for the population as a whole.
4.2.1 African-Americans
In Table 3 and Table 4 we repeat the analysis in Table 1 but look only at the pollution risk
impact and employment for specific ethnic and racial sub-populations. Columns three and
four of each table and The top two panels of Figure 7 show the results for African-Americans.
For African-Americans there appears to be a significant tradeoff between environmental
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quality for the population and employment. The tradeoff tails off at higher levels of pollution.
The coefficient shows that a 1 percent increase in pollution risk to the black population from
a facility is associated with an 0.4 percent increase in black employment at that facility. The
increase in employment in good jobs associated with a 1-percent increase in pollution risk is
somewhat smaller at 0.3 percent.
As the figures indicate, the increase in employment associated with increased exposure
to pollution risk is non-trivial, but the domain of the tradeoff is primarily at the lower
end of pollution risk among these high-pollution firms. Although the average elasticity of
employment over the entire domain of pollution risk is 0.4, much of this occurs at the low end
of the domain. In contrast, an increase in the black RSEI Score over the range above 10,000
generates essentially zero additional expected employment. The payoff in terms of good jobs
per additional unit of population pollution risk over this domain of pollution risk is even less.
In part, the tradeoff may simply reflect variation in the percentage of African-Americans
in the region surrounding the facility. Controlling for the percent black in the State reduces
somewhat the apparent tradeoff — results reported in column 4 of Tables 3 and 4, but the
tradeoff remains statistically significant even with this local demographic control.
4.2.2 Hispanics
The results for Hispanics are generally similar in direction and magnitude to those for African-
Americans, suggesting a jobs–environment tradeoff. These are shown in columns 5 and 6
of Tables 3 and 4 and in the middle two panels of Figure 7. The apparent tradeoff shrinks
substantially but remains significant when a control for state Hispanic share is included. As
with African-Americans, the tradeoff tails off substantially at higher levels of pollution risk,
and the tradeoff is weaker for good jobs. An increase in the Hispanic RSEI Score from 10,000
to 100,000 is associated with fewer than 10 additional jobs for Hispanic persons.
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4.2.3 Non-Hispanic Whites
The results for non-Hispanic whites are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Tables 3 and 4 and in
the bottom two panels of Figure 7.
Unlike the apparent jobs–environment tradeoff for Hispanics and for African-Americans,
there is no evident relationship between employment and population risk for non-Hispanic
whites. Indeed the curve is slightly (but not significantly) downward sloping over a substantial
share of the domain. The share of non-Hispanic whites in the state does positively correlate
with white employment, but differences in exposure of non-Hispanic whites to risk from
industrial environmental hazards does not.
4.3 Employment Share vs. Pollution Share
In this section of the results, we examine the racial and ethnic shares of toxic pollution risk
and of employment for four racial and ethnic groups: African-Americans; Native Americans;
Asian-Americans; and Hispanics. This analysis expands on the indication that there is some
tradeoff between jobs and environment for African-Americans and Hispanics by examining
the terms of the tradeoff.
4.3.1 African-Americans
Figure 8 shows the relationship between share of population risk from toxic pollution exposure
and employment share at the facility level for African-Americans. Each point represents an
establishment in terms of the share of its toxic pollution risk borne by African-Americans
(on the horizontal axis) and the share of its employment held by African-Americans (on the
vertical axis). The size of the dot represents the size of employment at the establishment and
the shade of the dot indicates the total population risk from airborne toxics emitted by the
establishment.
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The solid black 45◦ line indicates the hypothetical average relationship that would obtain if
access to employment and exposure to pollution for African-Americans were related exclusively
to prevalence in the population. The heavy concentration of points below the 45◦ line indicates
that the vast majority of these establishments impose toxic risk on African-Americans that is
greater than proportionate to the share of jobs held by African-Americans.
Because many establishment are concentrated in the region with less than 25 percent
shares of both risk and employment, we show a close-up of this region in the upper-right panel
of Figure 8. Even in the limited region the disparity between employment and exposure is
clear. From the full picture in the upper-left panel of Figure 8, it is clear that there are many
establishments for which a significant share of the toxic risk from industrial activity falls
upon African-Americans while only a small share of the jobs are held by African-Americans.
At the average facility in this sample of high-impact polluters, African-Americans bear
17.4 percent of the risk but hold only 10.8 percent of the jobs (a disparity of 6.6 percentage
points) and a mere 6.9 percent of the good jobs (a disparity of 10.5 percentage points).
In Table 5 we tabulate average facility shares of the toxic risk and of jobs and good jobs
for blacks by industry. The table also reports the average facility employment and the average
facility RSEI score for each industry. The table, with one row per industry, is in decreasing
order by the disparity between the share of the risk burden experienced and the share of jobs
held by African Americans.
Table 5 shows that for most industries African American populations experience a share
of risk that exceeds the African-American share of jobs. In terms of access to good jobs,
the disparity is stronger still. For example, in Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing,
which includes oil refining and is one of the highest sources of population risk from airborne
toxic industrial emissions, African-Americans receive 23 percent of the risk while holding
only 11 percent of the jobs and 8 percent of the good jobs.9
9In the report to EEOC the equivalent table reported these tabulations at the facility level, but they are
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The slope of a regression line computed for the upper-left panel of Figure 8 is 0.46
(s.e.= 0.02), which is less than half as steep as the 1.0 slope of the 45◦ line. That is,
one additional percentage point of additional black share of exposure to industrial risk
corresponds to only one-half percentage point of additional black representation on the
workforce of polluting facilities. The relationship is well below the one-for-one relationship
that would be expected based on representation in the population.
When we include the black share of the state population as a control variable, the coefficient
on the black share of the RSEI score falls to 0.34 (s.e. = 0.02) with virtually identical results
when we use state dummies rather than the state black share of the population. When
we instead include the black share of the county as the control variable, the coefficient on
the black share of the RSEI score falls to 0.26 (s.e. = 0.03). If population representation
functions as the baseline expectation for representation in the workforce, then these regression
coefficients that are well below 1 albeit positive, indicate that there is some additional access
to industrial employment for African-Americans based on additional pollution exposure
but that the addition is well below a one-for-one tradeoff between the jobs share and the
environment share. These results are reported in Table 6.
The lower-left panel of Figure 8 shows black access to “good jobs” (craft, managerial,
professional, and technical) at polluting facilities as a function of black population exposure
to industrial risk. Facilities are very heavily clustered below the 45◦ line indicating that
blacks almost always hold a share of good jobs at smaller than their share of population toxic
risk from polluting facilities. The slope of the regression line in for the lower-left panel of
Figure 8 is only 0.27 (s.e.= 0.01), a substantially lower implied return of access to good jobs
for pollution exposure than for access to any jobs.
In the lower-left panel of Figure 8, Craft Workers are included among the good jobs
suppressed here to maintain confidentiality. In some cases the disparity is very high. Among the highest
disparity facilities, the black share of pollution approaching 80 percent and the black share of jobs between
15 and 24 percent.
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category. The lower-right panel Figure 8 shows black access to good jobs when craft workers
are not included in the definition. The inclusion of craft workers in the definition substantially
increases black representation among good jobs. It is very rare for blacks to hold a share of
managerial, professional, or technical positions to the same extent that blacks are exposed to
risk from the facility.
4.3.2 Hispanics
Figure 9 shows the relationship at the facility level between population toxic-risk exposure
and jobs for Hispanics. Each point represents a facility in terms of the share of its toxic
pollution risk borne by Hispanics (on the horizontal axis) and the share of its employment
held by Hispanics (on the vertical axis). The size of the dot represents the size of employment
at the establishment and the shade of the dot indicates the total population risk from airborne
toxics emitted by the establishment.
The solid black 45◦ line indicates the hypothetical average relationship that would obtain
if access to employment and exposure to pollution for Hispanics were related exclusively to
prevalence in the population or if risk and employment were complementary. The heavy
concentration of points below the 45◦ line indicates that the vast majority of these establish-
ments impose toxic risk on Hispanics that is greater than proportionate to the share of jobs
held by Hispanics.
For Hispanics, the relationship between share of population exposure from and share
of employment at the facility is somewhat stronger than it is for African-Americans. The
regression coefficient for the scattergram in the upper-left panel of Figure 9 is 0.64 (s.e.= 0.02)
while it was only 0.46 for African-Americans. The addition of state Hispanic population
share reduces the coefficient on Hispanic share of risk to 0.57 (s.e., = 0.04) and to 0.49
(s.e.= 0.04) with the inclusion of state indicator variables. With the inclusion of county
Hispanic population share, the coefficient on exposure share is 0.25 (s.e.= 0.06), still indicating
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a sizable employment-share return to additional exposure share. These results are reported
in Table 8.
Because many establishment are concentrated in the region with less than 25 percent
shares of both risk and employment, we show a close-up of this region in the upper-right
panel of Figure 9. Even in the limited region the disparity between employment and exposure
is clear. From the full picture in Figure 9, it is clear that there are many establishments for
which a significant share of the toxic risk from industrial activity falls upon Hispanics while
only a small share of the jobs are held by Hispanics.
In the lower-left panel of Figure 9, craft workers are included among the good jobs category.
The lower-right panel of Figure 9 shows Hispanic access to good jobs when craft workers are
not included in the definition. The inclusion of craft workers in the definition substantially
increases Hispanic representation among good jobs. It is very rare for Hispanics to hold a
share of the other good jobs, i.e., managerial, professional, or technical positions to the same
extent that Hispanics are exposed to risk from the facility.
At the average facility in this sample of high-impact polluters, Hispanics bear 15.0 percent
of the risk but hold only 9.8 percent of the jobs (a disparity of 5.2 percentage points) and a
mere 6.8 percent of the good jobs (a disparity of 8.2 percentage points).
In Table 7, we report aggregated results by industry ranked from the highest disparity
between the Hispanic share of risk from airborne toxic releases and the Hispanic share of
employment. As with African-Americans, Hispanics experience a proportion of the toxic risk
from pollution that substantially exceeds the Hispanic share of jobs in most cases. Again,
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing, of which oil refining is a significant component,
has a substantial disparity: 25 percent of the risk burden of industry falls on Hispanics while
only 11 percent of jobs and 9 percent of good jobs are held by Hispanics. The aggregation to
industry averages masks enormous variation across facilities. Among the highest disparity
facilities, the Hispanic share of the risk burdens in the area of 70 percent with 10 to 18
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percent of jobs going to Hispanics.
4.3.3 Asian-Americans
Figure 10 shows the relationship at the facility level between population toxic-risk exposure
and jobs for Asian-Americans. Each point represents a facility in terms of its share of its
toxic pollution risk (RSEI Score) borne by Asian-Americans (on the horizontal axis) and the
share of its employment held by Asian-Americans (on the vertical axis). The size of the dot
represents the size of employment at the establishment and the shade of the dot indicates
the total population risk from airborne toxics emitted by the establishment.
Note that because Asian-Americans compose a relatively small percentage of the US
population, we limit both axes in the upper-left panel of Figure 10 from 0 to 0.5 without
losing any facilities and from 0 to 0.05 in the close-up in the upper-right panel of Figure 10.
For this reason, we also do not report regression results for Asian-Americans.
The solid black 45◦ line indicates the hypothetical average relationship that would obtain if
access to employment and exposure to pollution for Asian-Americans were related exclusively
to prevalence in the population. The majority of points fall below the 45◦ line, which indicates
a majority of facilities impose toxic risk on Asian Americans that is greater than proportionate
to the share of jobs held by Asian Americans.
The lower-left panel of Figure 10 shows the share of good jobs (craft, managerial, profes-
sional, and technical positions) held by Asian-Americans in relation to the share of population
risk from toxic exposure. There is no indication of systematic disparity. There is a lot of
variation, i.e., some facilities have higher Asian employment share than Asian toxic-risk share
and some facilities have higher Asian toxic-risk share than employment share.
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4.3.4 Native Americans and Alaska Natives
Figure 11 shows the relationship at the facility level between population toxic-risk exposure
and jobs for Native Americans. Each point represents a facility in terms of its share of its
toxic pollution risk (RSEI Score) borne by Native Americans (on the horizontal axis) and the
share of its employment held by Native Americans (on the vertical axis). The size of the dot
represents the size of employment at the establishment and the shade of the dot indicates
the total population risk from airborne toxics emitted by the establishment.
Note that because Native Americans are a relatively small percentage of the US population,
we limit both axes in the upper-left panel of Figure 11 from 0 to 0.1 without losing any
facilities and from 0 to 0.025 in the close-up in the upper-right panel of Figure 11. For this
reason, we also do not report regression results for Native Americans.
The lower-left panel of Figure 11 shows the share of good jobs (craft, managerial, pro-
fessional, and technical positions) held by Native Americans in relation to the share of
population risk from toxic exposure. There is no indication of systematic disparity. There is
a lot of variation, i.e., some facilities have higher Native American employment share than
Native American toxic-risk share and some facilities have higher Native American toxic-risk
share than employment share.
5 Discussion
Using matched data from EEOC and EPA we have examined the relationship at the facility
level between the exposure of population in the area around the facility to potential chronic
human health risk from airborne toxic releases and the employment. The analysis examines
data from the matched 712 of the 1,000 facilities generating the highest population risk from
airborne toxic releases. This represents a substantial increase in the scale of analysis of the
jobs-pollution relationship from General Accounting Office (2002).
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To assess environmental disparities by race and ethnicity, we examined the share of a
facility toxic risk burden borne by a racial or ethnic group in relation to its share of facility
employment, with equal shares as the no-disparity benchmark.
For both African-Americans and Hispanics there are substantial disparities between the
risk share and the employment share. Asian-Americans and Native Americans constitute too
small a minority of the population to report comparable results. At the average facility in
this sample of high-impact polluters, African-Americans bear 17.4 percent of the risk but hold
only 10.8 percent of the jobs (a disparity of 6.6 percentage points) and a mere 6.9 percent of
the good jobs (a disparity of 10.5 percentage points). At the average facility in this sample
of high-impact polluters, Hispanics bear 15.0 percent of the risk but hold only 9.8 percent of
the jobs (a disparity of 5.2 percentage points) and a mere 6.8 percent of the good jobs (a
disparity of 8.2 percentage points).
The scattergrams of employment share versus risk share imply that there is some tradeoff
of environmental quality for jobs for African Americans and Hispanics, but that the tradeoff
offers poor terms in which employment gains are far less than proportionate to environmental
costs. Furthermore, the tradeoff tails off concavely at higher levels of pollution so that there
appears to be little community return, in terms of additional employment, to substantial
increases in pollution.
When we examine the tradeoff between total population exposure and employment we
find that there is no apparent tradeoff in the sense of there being no employment gradient
between less and more polluting facilities. For the most part this is true among facilities in
the same industrial sectors, which are more likely to be using similar chemicals and processes,
and it is largely true within regions as well.
These are surprising results. The Toxics Release Inventory data are mandatory, self-
reported, and, in many cases, based on engineering estimates that associate the process
and the scale with an estimated level of release. Alternatives, practiced by a small fraction
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of TRI reporters, are methods of actual measurement of pollution release based on either
mass-balance methods (accounting for the mass of inputs and outputs to estimate the mass
of releases) or continuous or periodic monitoring of stack emissions.10 The modal method of
engineering estimates is likely to associate bigger facilities with more pollution. So there is
an almost necessary relationship between the volume of industrial activity and estimated
pollution releases. The absence of an association is thus unexpected. Facilities that generate
higher population risk provide neither additional employment nor additional employment in
good jobs.
There are several possible explanations for the non-association. First, the RSEI method
accounts for population exposure; so a bigger facility is not always strictly worse because
the facility may be located in a place where the population exposure to its emissions is
limited. Second, the industrial sectors may not be finely enough distinguished in the TRI
data to compare facilities using the same process at different scales. Finally it is possible that
substantial noise in pollution release estimates and that this measurement error attenuates
the estimated relationship.
An additional limitation is that we do not have a perfect counterfactual for the employment
that would have obtained in the absence of a polluting facility or in the presence of a different
polluting facility. A perfect market in amenities with compensating differentials might yield,
ex post, the result that communities already have the best pollution-jobs tradeoff available to
them with some communities, say those with high human capital, attracting high employment
at low pollution cost and other communities, say those with low human capital, required
to accept high pollution to attract high-employment facilities. However, many of the toxics
in the TRI are not immediately evident to nearby communities — many TRI chemicals,
although highly toxic, are low-volume pollutants and not necessarily marked by visible or
10See http://www3.epa.gov/trimewebhelp/WebHelp/tri_forms_and_instructions6_new_frmr_
sec5_column_b_basis_of_estimate_.htm for more detail on the basis of TRI release estimates.
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smellable evidence. So it is unlikely that optimal bargaining and compensation are in place.
Despite these potential limitations and concerns, the absence of a clear trade-off between
jobs and the environment is striking. There is growing evidence that the cost, in income or
jobs, of environmental regulation is often smaller than forecast (Goodstein, 1995; Goodstein
and Hodges, 1997) or that the impact of environmental regulation on employment and
economic activity is actually positive (Pollin, 2015; Bezdek et al., 2008). In this study, we find
little evidence that more pollution itself is associated with more or better jobs in aggregate, a
non-trade-off that should inform policymakers and local public and private decision-makers.
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Table 1: Jobs versus Pollution Risk: Linear regression results
log Employment Employment
Intercept 5.67∗∗∗ 5.76∗∗∗ 3.48∗∗∗ 7.60∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗ 514.56∗∗∗ 562.50
(0.41) (1.11) (0.93) (0.81) (0.80) (52.50) (503.41)
log(RSEI Score) −0.01 0.01 0.18∗ −0.17∗ 0.12 −4.73
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (43.61)
RSEI Score/1000000 −21.59
(43.37)
State Dummies Yes
Industry Dummies Yes
Adj. R2 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Subsample EPA Reg 6 EPA Reg 5 Chem. Mfg
Num. obs. 712 712 147 195 152 712 712
Each column shows the coefficients from a linear regression of employment on the total population risk for each facility. In columns
1–5 the dependent variable is natural log of employment, i.e., log of the count of total employees in all occupations at the facility. In
columns 6–7, the dependent variable is the level of employment. In column 3, the sample is limited to facilities in EPA Region 6,
South Central, which comprises Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. In column 4, the sample is limited to
facilities in EPA Region 5, Great Lakes, which comprises Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In column 5,
the sample is limited to Chemical Manufacturing facilities (NAICS code 325). Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
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Table 2: Good Jobs versus Pollution Risk: Linear regression results
log Good Jobs Good Jobs
Intercept 4.99∗∗∗ 5.13∗∗∗ 2.19∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 307.63∗∗∗ 256.64
(0.47) (1.24) (1.05) (0.91) (0.89) (36.33) (348.38)
log(RSEI Score) −0.02 0.02 0.24∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.14 4.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (30.18)
RSEI Score/1000000 −15.84
(30.01)
State Dummies Yes
Industry Dummies Yes
Adj. R2 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
Subsample EPA Reg 6 EPA Reg 5 Chem. Mfg
Num. obs. 712 712 147 195 152 712 712
Each column shows the coefficients from a linear regression of employment in managerial, professional, technical, and craft
occupational categories on the total population risk for each facility. In columns 1–5 the dependent variable is natural log of
employment, i.e., log of the count of employees in good jobs at the facility. In columns 6–7, the dependent variable is the level of
employment. In column 3, the sample is limited to facilities in EPA Region 6, South Central, which comprises Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. In column 4, the sample is limited to facilities in EPA Region 5, Great Lakes, which comprises
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In column 5, the sample is limited to Chemical Manufacturing facilities
(NAICS code 325). Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
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Table 3: Jobs versus Pollution Risk, by race: Linear regression results
Non-Hispanic Whites African-Americans Hispanics
Intercept 4.74∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗ −0.60∗ −2.01∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗
(0.40) (0.43) (0.28) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25)
log(White Score) 0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
State percent white 1.65∗∗∗
(0.33)
log(Black Score) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
State percent black 4.29∗∗∗
(0.66)
log(Hispanic Score) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
State percent hisp 6.16∗∗∗
(0.51)
Adj. R2 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.41
Num. obs. 712 712 712 712 712 712
Each column shows the coefficients from a linear regression of log employment on log population risk for three
race/ethnicity groups. In columns 1–2 the dependent variable is natural log of non-Hispanic white employment, in
columns 3–4 African-American, and in columns 5–6 Hispanic. We added 1 to all employment figures and 10 to the
racially/ethnically specific RSEI Scores to avoid taking log of zero. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
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Table 4: Good Jobs versus Pollution Risk, by race: Linear regression results
Non-Hispanic Whites African-Americans Hispanics
Intercept 4.52∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗ −1.89∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗
(0.43) (0.47) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23)
log(White Score) 0.01 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
State percent white 0.95∗∗
(0.36)
log(Black Score) 0.31∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
State percent black 3.73∗∗∗
(0.65)
log(Hispanic Score) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
State percent hisp 5.86∗∗∗
(0.47)
Adj. R2 −0.00 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.38
Num. obs. 712 712 712 712 712 712
Each column shows the coefficients from a linear regression of log employment in good jobs on log population risk for
three race/ethnicity groups. In columns 1–2 the dependent variable is natural log of non-Hispanic white employment,
in columns 3–4 African-American, and in columns 5–6 Hispanic. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
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Table 5: Industries Ranked by Black Jobs-Environment Disparity
Black Share Total
Industry RSEI Score Jobs Good Jobs Jobs RSEI Score
Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.373 0.184 0.086 180 61772
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.227 0.111 0.080 524 160542
Chemical Manufacturing 0.226 0.121 0.091 359 321531
Food Manufacturing 0.242 0.150 0.086 893 107296
Wood Product Manufacturing 0.218 0.140 0.048 277 198557
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 0.163 0.088 0.048 272 478009
Utilities 0.151 0.087 0.081 222 96147
Primary Metal Manufacturing 0.152 0.097 0.055 517 214711
Machinery Manufacturing 0.114 0.060 0.036 412 271356
Paper Manufacturing 0.185 0.134 0.072 685 58656
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.103 0.070 0.034 937 174418
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.192 0.162 0.077 249 81754
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.197 0.169 0.095 490 138168
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.032 0.024 0.034 41 1309184
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.143 0.141 0.069 343 81175
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.004 0.003 0.002 549 235290
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.124 0.128 0.080 1676 493727
Support Activities for Transportation 0.102 0.114 0.092 368 192028
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 0.212 0.246 0.178 864 289203
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.209 0.248 0.120 685 179809
Pipeline Transportation 0.125 0.167 0.172 30 177970
Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table 6: African-American share of jobs versus share of toxics risk: Linear regression results
Black Share of
Jobs Good Jobs
Intercept 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
Black toxic share 0.46∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
State percent black 0.42∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03)
County percent black 0.33∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03)
State Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.45
Num. obs. 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712
Each column shows the coefficients from a linear regression of the black share of jobs on the black share of risk for each facility. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 7: Industries Ranked by Hispanic Jobs-Environment Disparity
Hispanic Share Total
Industry RSEI Score Jobs Good Jobs Jobs RSEI Score
Pipeline Transportation 0.677 0.100 0.103 30 177970
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.252 0.105 0.091 524 160542
Chemical Manufacturing 0.193 0.065 0.054 359 321531
Machinery Manufacturing 0.105 0.047 0.029 412 271356
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.082 0.025 0.005 685 179809
Support Activities for Transportation 0.810 0.753 0.736 368 192028
Paper Manufacturing 0.063 0.010 0.007 685 58656
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 0.153 0.101 0.075 864 289203
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.147 0.097 0.070 1676 493727
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.184 0.135 0.130 549 235290
Utilities 0.061 0.015 0.015 222 96147
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.189 0.151 0.100 937 174418
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.117 0.089 0.057 343 81175
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.045 0.018 0.008 249 81754
Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.044 0.017 0.028 180 61772
Food Manufacturing 0.160 0.139 0.069 893 107296
Wood Product Manufacturing 0.049 0.034 0.008 277 198557
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.108 0.098 0.068 490 138168
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.031 0.024 0.000 41 1309184
Primary Metal Manufacturing 0.131 0.127 0.081 517 214711
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 0.153 0.158 0.100 272 478009
Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table 8: Hispanic share of jobs versus share of toxics risk: Linear regression results
Hispanic Share of
Jobs Good Jobs
Intercept 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01∗ 0.03 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
Hispanic toxic share 0.64∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
State percent hisp 0.18∗∗ 0.13∗
(0.07) (0.05)
County percent hisp 0.63∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.06)
State Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.53
Num. obs. 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712
Each column shows the coefficients from a linear regression of the Hispanic share of jobs on the Hispanic share of risk for each facility. Standard errors
in parentheses.
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Figure 1: EPA’s Risk Screening Environmental Indicators: Schematic of Air Plume Model
RSEI takes the toxic air release from each industrial source and uses wind and other information to 
determine where the releases go within a grid around each facility. RSEI attributes higher health
impacts to grid cells exposed to higher-toxicity chemicals.
Where the grids intersect,
toxicities can be added up 
from multiple sources to
determine an overall 
neighborhood health impact.
To determine who is 
affected in each 
neighborhood we use
census information to 
determine the race, 
age, and income of 
residents. We can use 
this to look at both 
overall impact and impact for sub-groups.
101 km
1 km
The 101 km × 101 km catchment area with 1-square-kilometer grid cells pictured above was used in earlier RSEI versions and has been
replaced with a 50-km radius with 810m × 810m grid cells as of RSEI version 2.3.0). Source: Ash et al. (2009).
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Figure 2: Nonparametric Density Plot of RSEI Scores from Highest-Score TRI Facilities
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N = 712 facilities in matched TRI–EEO-1 sample from the 1,000 TRI facilities with the highest air-based RSEI Scores. Source: Authors’
computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 3: Nonparametric Density Plot of RSEI Score per Job
(High Score TRI Facilities)
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N = 712 facilities in matched TRI–EEO-1 sample from the 1,000 TRI
facilities with the highest air-based RSEI Scores. Good jobs are defined
as managerial, professional, technical, and craft occupations. Source:
Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 4: Jobs versus Pollution Risk
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N = 712 facilities. The horizontal axis shows the log of RSEI Score, a measure of the potential chronic human health risk from industrial toxic
air releases. The vertical axis shows the log of facility employment. The locally smoothed regression function is estimated with general additive
model with integrated smoothness estimation using the mgcv package in R. The smoothing parameter is selected with the default
cross-validation method. Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 5: Jobs versus Pollution Risk, by EPA Region
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N = 712 facilities stratified by 10 EPA Regions. The horizontal axis shows the log of RSEI Score, a measure of the potential chronic human
health risk from industrial toxic air releases. The vertical axis shows the log of total employment. The locally smoothed regression function is
estimated with the general additive model with integrated smoothness estimation using the mgcv package in R. The smoothing parameter is
selected with the default cross-validation method. Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 6: Jobs versus Pollution Risk, by Industry
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Figure 7: Jobs versus Pollution Risk, by Race/Ethnicity
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N = 712 facilities. The horizontal axis shows the log of RSEI Score, a measure of the potential
chronic human health risk from industrial toxic air releases. The vertical axis shows the log of
employment. The locally smoothed regression function is estimated with general additive
model with integrated smoothness estimation using the mgcv package in R. The smoothing
parameter is selected with the default cross-validation method. Source: Authors’ computations
with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 8: Share of jobs versus share of toxics risk for African-Americans
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Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 9: Share of jobs versus share of toxics risk for Hispanics
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Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 10: Share of jobs versus share of toxics risk for Asian-Americans
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Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Figure 11: Share of jobs versus share of toxics risk for Native Americans
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Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table A.1: Distribution of job categories, by sample
EEO-1 EEO-1 TRI NAICS EEO-1 TRI match
Good jobs
Exec/Sr-Level Officials & Managers (1.1) 0.016 0.022 0.011
First/Mid-Level Officials & Managers (1.2) 0.094 0.109 0.101
Professionals (2) 0.187 0.207 0.176
Technicians (3) 0.058 0.057 0.061
Craft Workers (6) 0.058 0.105 0.247
Other Jobs
Sales Workers (4) 0.127 0.047 0.010
Administrative Support Workers (5) 0.134 0.114 0.038
Operatives (7) 0.100 0.171 0.308
Laborers & Helpers (8) 0.072 0.099 0.042
Service Workers (9) 0.154 0.068 0.005
The first column contains the distribution of employment by job category for all establishments included in the
EEO-1 data. The second column contains the distribution of employment by job category for all establishments
in the EEO-1 data limited to the NAICS codes that appear in the Toxics Release Inventory. The third column
contains the distribution of employment by job category for all facilities in the EEO-1–TRI matched data. The
EEO job category code number is in parentheses following each job category. Source: Authors’ computations
with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table A.2: Distribution of industries
Establishments Employment
(count) (percent) (percent)
Chemical Manufacturing 152 0.213 0.151
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 141 0.198 0.106
Primary Metal Manufacturing 129 0.181 0.184
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 58 0.081 0.269
Utilities 45 0.063 0.028
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 43 0.060 0.062
Machinery Manufacturing 43 0.060 0.049
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 21 0.029 0.019
Paper Manufacturing 19 0.027 0.036
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 15 0.021 0.020
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 8 0.011 0.021
Food Manufacturing 8 0.011 0.020
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 7 0.010 0.017
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 7 0.010 0.005
Wood Product Manufacturing 6 0.008 0.004
Waste Management and Remediation Services 4 0.006 0.002
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 3 0.004 0.005
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 1 0.001 0.002
Support Activities for Transportation 1 0.001 0.001
Pipeline Transportation 1 0.001 0.000
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 1 0.001 0.000
The first two columns show the distribution of facilities in the EEO-1–TRI matched data. The third column shows the
distribution of employment. Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table A.3: Distribution across EPA Regions
Facilities Workers
New England (1) 0.032 0.046
NY/NJ (2) 0.042 0.027
Mid-Atlantic (3) 0.130 0.090
Southeast (4) 0.153 0.103
Great Lakes (5) 0.273 0.302
South Central (6) 0.206 0.179
Midwest (7) 0.058 0.076
Mountains and Plains (8) 0.018 0.009
Pacific Southwest (9) 0.058 0.054
Pacific Northwest (10) 0.029 0.114
The first column shows the distribution of facilities and
the second column shows the distribution of workers
across US EPA Regions for the EEO-1–TRI matched
data. Source: Authors’ computations with EEO-1 and
RSEI data.
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Table A.4: Unmatched and Matched TRI Facilities,
Distribution across EPA Regions
Unmatched Matched
New England (1) 0.025 0.032
NY/NJ (2) 0.050 0.041
Mid-Atlantic (3) 0.121 0.130
Southeast (4) 0.160 0.153
Great Lakes (5) 0.281 0.273
South Central (6) 0.164 0.209
Midwest (7) 0.046 0.057
Mountains and Plains (8) 0.036 0.018
Pacific Southwest (9) 0.060 0.057
Pacific Northwest (10) 0.057 0.029
The table shows the distribution of facilities across US EPA
Regions. The first column shows the distribution of TRI
facilities that were not matched to the EEO-1 data and the
second column shows the distribution of TRI facilities that
were matched to EEO-1 data. Source: Authors’
computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table A.5: Unmatched and Matched TRI Facilities, Distribution across Industrial Sectors
Unmatched Matched
Administrative and Support Services 0.014 0.000
Chemical Manufacturing 0.160 0.211
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.000 0.013
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 0.010 0.011
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 0.265 0.171
Food Manufacturing 0.007 0.011
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.003 0.003
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.007 0.000
Machinery Manufacturing 0.066 0.073
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 0.003 0.000
Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 0.010 0.003
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.010 0.006
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.014 0.020
National Security and International Affairs 0.021 0.000
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.031 0.034
Paper Manufacturing 0.000 0.027
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.084 0.064
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.014 0.011
Primary Metal Manufacturing 0.164 0.165
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.007 0.001
Repair and Maintenance 0.000 0.001
Textile Product Mills 0.000 0.004
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.042 0.095
Utilities 0.045 0.063
Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.010 0.006
Wood Product Manufacturing 0.010 0.007
The table shows the distribution of facilities across 3-Digit NAICS Codes. The first column shows the
distribution of TRI facilities that were not matched to the EEO-1 data and the second column shows the
distribution of TRI facilities that were matched to EEO-1 data. Source: Authors’ computations with
EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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Table A.6: Unmatched and Matched TRI Facilities, RSEI Scores
Unmatched Matched
Mean RSEI Score 278,767 293,898
S.E. of RSEI Score 43,560 43,914
SD log(RSEI Score) 1.20 1.17
Rank among Top 1,000 502 501
Mean Black RSEI Score 51,533 44,325
S.E. of Black RSEI Score 12,587 6,740
Mean Hispanic RSEI Score 47,994 62,747
S.E. of Hispanic RSEI Score 9,533 16,060
Mean Asian RSEI Score 8,316 12,463
S.E. of Asian RSEI Score 1,202 4,144
Mean Native American RSEI Score 1,189 1,159
S.E. of Native American RSEI Score 187 191
The first column shows RSEI Scores of TRI facilities that were not
matched to the EEO-1 data and the second column shows RSEI Scores
of TRI facilities that were matched to EEO-1 data. Source: Authors’
computations with EEO-1 and RSEI data.
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